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CROSSING THE LINE: PRIME, SUBPRIME, AND
PREDATORY LENDING
Nathaniel R. Hull*

I. INTRODUCTION
The cornerstone of the “American Dream” has long been marked by the purchase
of a home.1 Most families cannot afford to purchase a home with cash and, almost
universally, need financing. Financing for a home purchase begins when a person or
couple applies and is preliminarily approved for a home loan by a lender. The lender’s
decision to approve is based on a number of different factors that are thought to predict
how likely it is for the borrower to repay the loan according to its terms. The factors
used to make this prediction have undergone drastic reformulations over the past
century. For instance, before the 1930s, qualifying for a home loan usually meant that
the borrower had to have a fifty percent down payment; that is, a borrower needed to

* J.D. Candidate, 2009, University of Maine School of Law. The author thanks his wife, Reid
Hayton Hull, for her patience and advice. Also, thank you to my families on both coasts for your unending
support. Finally, thank you to Lauren Blake, to whom I owe a great debt for being such a wonderful editor.
As always, the mistakes are mine alone. The majority of this Comment was written at the end of 2007 and
my concerns about freezing Maine’s credit market have subsequently become a national reality. I decided
to leave the Comment as written with the understanding that our situation is far too fluid for there to ever
be a “right spot” to call the work complete.
1. Homeownership has been both an individual and a governmental priority since at least the 1930s.
James Surowiecki, Home Economics, THE NEW YORKER, Mar. 10, 2008. Arguments in favor of broad
homeownership center around the “tremendous” social and economic benefits that are attendant to owing
a home. Id. Among the social benefits are that neighborhoods are stabilized, which, in turn, makes people
more willing to invest in a community. Id. This argument proceeds from the belief that people make a
social investment in the area in which they purchase a home, and that social investment pays dividends to
the surrounding community. Perhaps more important to the individual homeowner is the economic benefit
of owning a home. The chief economic benefit to the individual owner is that homes, oftentimes, function
as “forced-savings program that allows people to leverage their income and build wealth.” Id. The general
appreciation of a home combined with the reduction in liability through mortgage payments allows the
average citizen to generate wealth on a scale not commensurate with their income. For example, “[I]f you
earn [$80,000] a year, no one will lend you [$400,000] to buy stocks, but plenty of people will lend you that
money to buy a house.” Id. This ability to generate wealth far beyond your salary is the economic strength
of being “leveraged” and, as the example deftly points out, most of the general population would never have
the opportunity to experience the financial power of leverage but for the priority we place, as a nation, on
homeownership. Of course, as the nation is experiencing now, when home prices are stagnate, or even
falling, the tremendous downside of being leveraged becomes apparent–people owe more on their
mortgages than their homes are worth. Id. As the popular oxymoron goes, when people “cannot afford to
sell” their homes, it works a complete reversal upon the traditional benefits of homeownership. For
example, people are now forced to stay in the communities in which they currently reside, despite failing
local job markets, because they do not have the money pay off the difference between what they owe on the
mortgage and the price they can fetch for their home. Id. This calls into question the benefit of
neighborhood stability, however, as not being able to move to areas where work is more readily available
works an economic disservice. Id. In sum, it is unlikely that homeownership will ever stop being an
individual or governmental priority; however, as the recent economic slowdown has shown, there are
substantial downsides associated with widespread homeownership.
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have at least one-half of the purchase price of the home in savings before a bank would
provide funding for the other half.2 Additionally, before the 1930s, most home loans
had a variable interest rate, and the borrower and the bank commonly renegotiated the
terms of the loan each year.3 Finally, before the 1930s, the payments the borrower
made on the mortgage generally were for interest only and the principal balance due
was paid down using separate “balloon” payments.4 In response to the Great
Depression, during which many families were forced into foreclosure because they
could not afford the balloon payments, this practice changed.5 The change meant that
home loans were made to individuals for a fixed period of time, usually twenty years,
and the principal balance was paid down slowly.6 Additionally, the new “typical”
homebuyer had a twenty percent, instead of fifty percent, down payment. However,
both before and after the Great Depression, and, in fact, until recently, the home
mortgage generally was approved and funded by a deposit-taking bank.7
The practice of banks lending to borrowers who have significant down payments,
(i.e., twenty percent) and good credit histories continues today, although this “prime
lending” represents a smaller and smaller portion of the total mortgage market.8 The
shrinking market share of the prime mortgage loan is a result of the advent and rapid
expansion of so-called “subprime lending,” beginning in the mid-1990s. Simply put,
the subprime lending market is populated by borrowers who would not have qualified
for conventional home loans because of their lower-than-average credit scores, low net
incomes, or low savings.9 Generally, these are borrowers who would have been
rejected by traditional deposit-taking banks because the risk of lending money to these
borrowers would have been deemed too great. Undeniably, access to loan funds from
non-traditional sources made the dream of home ownership attainable for a much
larger segment of the population.10 Yet the subprime lending arena has also spawned
several ethically questionable lending practices, often loosely grouped under the
heading “predatory lending practices.”11 These practices seek to exploit borrowers

2. See How We Got into the Subprime Lending Mess, KNOWLEDGE @ WHARTON (Sept. 19, 2007),
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=1812.
3. Id.; see also PAUL G. CRETEAU, MAINE REAL ESTATE LAW 235-36 (1971) (“The term mortgage,
which was common prior to the great depression of the thirties, usually called for quarterly or semi-annual
payments of interest, with the principal debt payable in a lump sum at the end of the term, which was
typically three to five years.”).
4. Id.; see also PETER M. BARNETT & JOSEPH A. MCKENZIE, ALTERNATIVE MORTGAGE INSTRUMENTS
5-1 (1984) (“A nonamortizing mortgage is one in which a loan becomes, or may become, due and payable
before it is fully amortized. Nonamortizing mortgages are more commonly referred to as balloon mortgages
. . . .”) A “balloon payment” is the common name the large payment made under the terms of the
nonamortizing, or balloon, mortgages.
5. See How We Got into the Subprime Lending Mess, supra note 2.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See generally The Role of the Secondary Market in Subprime Mortgage Lending Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit, 110th Cong. (2007), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_house_hearings&docid=f:37206.pdf.
9. Heather M. Tashman, The Subprime Lending Industry: An Industry in Crisis, 124 BANKING L.J.
407, 407-08 (2007).
10. Id. at 407.
11. See generally Dulce J. Foster, Pursuing the Predators: Regulators’ Response to Mortgage Fraud,
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who, because of the risk associated with lending money to them, have far fewer options
for financing. The exploitation can come in the form of onerous repayment terms and
large up-front fees with little or no benefit to the borrower. A number of catch phrases
have become synonymous with predatory lending including “asset-based lending,”12
“loan-flipping” and “equity stripping,”13 “loan-packing,”14 “steering,”15 and “abusive
broker kickbacks.”16
Elizabeth Renuart of the National Consumer Law Center has suggested that
understanding how the predatory marketplace operates is necessary for a number of
reasons.17 First, an understanding of the market will allow researchers to narrowly
tailor studies to obtain the most accurate results.18 Second, community resources
aimed at addressing the effects of predatory lending need cogent teaching and writing
on the subject.19 “Finally, the public, including legislators, judges, and the media,
needs to understand the causes of this type of lending and its effects on individual
homeowners and our society as a whole.”20 However, Renuart also cautioned that
“proposals to regulate mortgage loan abuses and those profiting from them will not be
successful unless protections are tailored to stop the harm to homeowners without
significantly affecting the flow of legitimate and fairly priced credit.”21
These predatory lending practices and abuses were the targets of the Maine Senate
when, on June 5, 2007, by a unanimous vote of 35-0, the Senate passed a broad
sweeping act aimed at curbing abusive mortgage lending practices in Maine.22 “An Act
to Protect Maine Homeowners from Predatory Lending,” Legislative Document 1869,
(“Original Act”) was signed into law by Governor Baldacci on June 11, 2007, and

62 BENCH & B. MINN. 18 (2007); Marvis W. Kennedy, Don’t Let Your Client be Labeled a Predatory
Lender, 89 ILL. B.J. 595 (2001); David Reiss, Subprime Standardization: How Rating Agencies Allow
Predatory Lending to Flourish in the Secondary Mortgage Market, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 985 (2006);
Lynne F. Riley, The Bankruptcy Perspective: Predatory Lending in the Home Mortgage Market, 2007
ANN. SURV. OF BANKR. LAW PART II S 13 (2007).
12. Asset-based lending is defined as “making unaffordable loans based on the borrower’s home equity
without regard to the borrower’s ability to repay the loan obligation.” Riley, supra note 11, at 13.
13. Loan-flipping and equity stripping occur when a borrower is induced to repeatedly refinance a loan
“even though the refinance transaction is not in the borrower’s best interest.” Id.
14. Loan-packing occurs when lenders engage in “fraud or deception to conceal the true nature of the
debt obligation from a naïve borrower.” Id.
15. Steering happens when a “borrower receives a more expensive loan than he or she could qualify
for accounting for legitimate risk to the lender.” CARLA DICKSTEIN ET AL., PREDATORY MORTGAGES IN
MAINE: RECENT TRENDS AND THE PERSISTENCE OF ABUSIVE LENDING IN THE SUBPRIME MORTGAGE
MARKET 14 (2006), available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/rr009-Predatory-Lending-Maine0206.pdf.
16. These are indirect payments that lenders give to mortgage brokers for getting borrowers to finance
with particular loan products that often carry a higher interest rate than the borrower should receive based
on the borrower’s risk. This practice is closely tied to steering. Id. at 14-15.
17. Elizabeth Renuart, An Overview of the Predatory Mortgage Lending Process, 15 HOUSING POL’Y
DEBATE 15, 467, 469 (2004).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. (emphasis added).
22. See L.D. 1869 (123rd Legis. 2007)
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became effective on January 1, 2008.23 However, on January 8, 2008, just a few days
after the Original Act went into effect, the Maine Legislature passed “An Act Relating
to Mortgage Lending and Credit Availability” (“Emergency Amendment”),24 which is
a lengthy amendment to the Original Act. The Emergency Amendment sprung from
a fear in the legislature that some of the provisions of the Original Act may ultimately
have the unintended consequence of further destabilizing the mortgage market in
Maine by drying up credit.25 The legislature further amended the Original Act by
passing a second amendment (“Second Amendment”) later in 2008.26
This Comment seeks to understand the implications of the Act and the
Amendments for the credit markets in Maine. In Part II, this Comment explores the
background and the boundaries of the legitimate subprime lending market—a market
that remains a valuable resource for borrowers unable to qualify for traditional
mortgage products—versus the predatory lending practices that rightfully are the target
of state action. In Part III of this Comment, the original response of the Maine
Legislature, known as “An Act to Protect Maine Homeowners,” is detailed and certain
key provisions are compared with the Emergency Amendment, with particular attention
paid to how the anti-flipping provision will now apply in light of the Emergency
Amendment. Finally, in Part IV, this Comment suggests that the Maine Legislature
should (1) continue narrowing the scope of the anti-flipping provision and (2) suggest
other areas of the Original Act that should be narrowed or repealed in order to prevent
any additional destabilization of the credit market in Maine. This Comment concludes
that the Maine Legislature, and those who supported the passage of the Original Act,
have crossed the line between protecting homeowners from abusive lending practices
and stepped into the area of “significantly affecting the flow of legitimate and fairly
priced credit.”27
I. THE U.S. MORTGAGE MARKET AND SUBPRIME LENDING:
PROBLEMS AND PERCEPTIONS
A. What is Subprime Lending?
At the most abstract level, it generally is accepted that there is a trifurcated
mortgage market in the United States: a prime market, a legitimate subprime lending

23. Id.
24. See 2008 Me. Legis. Serv. 6-10 (West).
25. Edward D. Murphy, Legislators Rush to Fix Lending Law, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Jan. 13,
2008, at F1. According to House Speaker Glen Cummings, the Original Act’s sponsor, the Emergency
Amendment was needed because of “the whole issue of access to credit and stability in the lending
industry.”
26. See Sen. Amend. A to L.D. 1869, No. S-201 (123rd Legis. 2008), which provides:
Amend[ing] the amendment in section 35 by inserting after the first paragraph the
following: That portion of the section of this Part that enacts the Maine Revised Statutes,
Title 9-A, section 8-206-D, subsection 1, paragraph G does not apply to the refinancing after
January 1, 2008 of a loan that did not require documentation of income or required limited
documentation of income and was entered into on or before January 1, 2008.
Id.
27. Renuart, supra note 17, at 469.
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market, and a predatory lending market.28 Despite the trifurcated mortgage market,
from a lender’s perspective, all residential home mortgages roughly may be
categorized as either prime or subprime; the grouping is simply a function of a lender’s
view of the risk involved with extending credit to the particular borrower.29 If the
borrower meets certain established criteria, she qualifies for a prime mortgage, and if
she does not meet these criteria, she only qualifies for a subprime loan. From the
borrower’s perspective, being screened for a loan based on risk-of-default suggests that
oftentimes there is a clear demarcation between those borrowers who qualify for prime,
or conventional, mortgage products and those who would not obtain the financing but
for the relaxed standards of the subprime lending market.30
The demarcation between prime and subprime loans is fairly standardized
throughout the United States and is reflected in the requirements of the secondary
mortgage market purchasing guidelines.31 Under these guidelines, a borrower must
meet three major criteria to be eligible for a prime (or conventional) mortgage: (1) a
FICO score32 greater than 660; (2) full documentation of income; and (3) a loan
amount less than the maximum size loan that Fannie Mae33 and Freddie Mac34 are
allowed to purchase.35
The prime market primarily services middle- and upper-class Americans who are
accustomed to receiving competitive interest rates and “paying little in the way of fees
to buy or repair their homes, purchase cars and other consumer goods, take vacations,
and send their children off to college.”36 In its purest form, subprime lending exists to

28. See Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics
of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1258 (2002).
29. See generally DICKSTEIN ET AL., supra note 15.
30. Tashman, supra note 9, at 409.
31. DICKSTEIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 18.
32. Id. A credit score created by Fair Isaac Corporation (FICO) is used to measure consumer credit
worthiness. See generally FICO Credit Scores http://www.myfico.com.
33. President Franklin D. Roosevelt created Fannie Mae in 1938 in response to the perceived lack of
consistent supply of mortgage funds across the United States. FANNIE MAE, AN INTRODUCTION TO FANNIE
MAE 3 (2008), available at http://www.fanniemae.com/aboutfm/index.jhtml;jsessionid=HTW04BM3
CCFTHJ2FECHSFGA?p=About+Fannie+Mae. In 1968 Fannie Mae became a privately-owned company,
and in 1992 its traditional mission greatly expanded. Id. The current role of Fannie Mae occupies three
distinct business units: first, Fannie Mae purchases mortgage loans from lenders for cash to hold in their
portfolio; second, Fannie Mae issues mortgage-backed securities in exchange for pools of mortgages from
lenders; third, Fannie Mae continues to support its original function of providing liquidity to the lending
markets by purchasing and selling mortgage loans and mortgage-related securities. Id. at 6. Fannie Mae
has a federal charter which mandates that it “channel its efforts into increasing the availability and affordability of homeownership for low-, moderate-, and middle-income Americans.” Id. at 3. Fannie Mae’s
common stock is listed on the New York Stock Exchange and traded under the symbol “FNM.” Id.
34. Freddie Mac, much like Fannie Mae, was created by congressional charter in 1970 with the mission
to “stabilize the nation’s mortgage markets and expand opportunities for homeownership and affordable
rental housing.” FREDDIE MAC, JUST THE FACTS: HOW WE MAKE HOME POSSIBLE 4 (2008), available at
http://www.freddiemac.com/landing/2007/mission1.html?cmpid=bac_mission_1&attr=thenote_728x90.
Freddie Mac does not make loans to homebuyers and, instead, it “buys mortgages from lenders such as
commercial banks, mortgage banks, savings institutions and credit unions.” Id. at 5. According to Freddie
Mac, it helps finance one in six American homes. Id.
35. DICKSTEIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 18.
36. Renuart, supra note 17, at 474.
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service borrowers who did not qualify for a prime mortgage because the borrower
lacks one of the abovementioned criteria. Despite the fact that when evaluating a
borrower’s credit-risk, in certain cases, there may be little practical difference between
those borrowers who qualify for a prime loan and those who only qualify, or are
steered into, a subprime loan; the differences in the interest a borrower will have to pay
to borrow an equivalent amount of money is significant.37 Finally, once in the realm
of the subprime market, loans are further divided according to the level of risk
associated with the particular borrower and assigned a “grade” ranging from “A-” to
“D,” with “A-” being just shy of qualifying for a conventional loan.38
B. Who are the Borrowers in the Subprime Market?
Instead of a borrower simply being a greater credit risk, some disturbing trends are
emerging suggesting that discrimination and steering may account for a borrower being
placed into the subprime arena.39 African Americans and Hispanics are “disproportionately represented in the subprime market, even at upper-income levels.”40
Additionally, “[l]ow- and moderate-income families, women, and older homeowners
may be overrepresented in the subprime and predatory markets.”41 Although not the
focus of this Comment, more attention will need to be paid to disseminating vital
information to communities disproportionately impacted by discrimination and steering
as these patterns continue to reveal themselves.
C. A Brief History of Subprime Lending
Simply identifying the subprime lending market as a segment of the greater
mortgage market servicing borrowers “who, for a variety of reasons, have lower-thanaverage credit scores and would otherwise be denied credit”42 or, more nefariously, as
an area of lending overrun with discrimination, does little to explain how the subprime
market developed and, more recently, how the fallout from defaults in the subprime
lending market has effected such a widespread economic impact.43

37. Id. at 475 (noting that between January 18, 2001, and December 4, 2003, the average prime loan
borrower would expect to pay between 5.97 percent and 7.02 percent interest, however, during that same
time, the average subprime borrower, depending on what credit “grade” they were, could expect to pay
between a low of 7.05 percent and a high of 12.41 percent interest).
38. Id. at 474.
39. Id. at 477.
40. Id. “Lower income blacks receive 2.4 times as many subprime loans as lower-income whites;
however, upper-income blacks receive 3 times as many subprime loans as whites with comparable income.”
Id. (citing CALVIN BRADFORD, CENTER FOR COMMUNITY CHANGE, RISK OR RACE?: RACIAL DISPARITIES
AND THE SUBPRIME REFINANCE MARKET (2002)).
41. Id. at 478 (noting that in 1998 “about 50 percent of the subprime refinancing market consisted of
loans to low- and moderate-income borrowers, whereas this percentage . . . was just 34 percent in the prime
market. Women account for 29 percent of subprime refinance mortgages, compared with 19 percent of all
refinancing mortgages.”).
42. Tashman, supra note 9, at 408.
43. See, e.g., Carrick Mollenkamp & Edward Taylor, Moving the Market: Woes Know No Border,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 2007, at A1 (“Banks and investors in Germany and Norway are facing new losses
from exposures to U.S. subprime mortgages, highlighting how credit problems continue to seep into places
far afield for the U.S.”).
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Within the overarching subprime mortgage arena, one can find three distinct
businesses: (1) loan origination, (2) loan sales (or securitization), and (3) loan servicing.44
A borrower who is unable to qualify for a prime loan would approach, or be solicited by,
a subprime lender for the loan origination. In the first distinct business group, a typical
subprime lender originates loans via two channels: wholesale and retail.45 The wholesale
channel functions through intermediaries, with mortgage brokers originating the loans
that the lender, in turn, funds.46 This route means that the borrower is dealing with a
middleman, the broker, who would handle the screening process and gather the needed
documentation. When it is time to actually fund the loan, the lender would write the
check, with the broker taking a commission. The retail channel, on the other hand,
involves the lender providing loans through their own employees directly to the
borrower.47 Notice that the only difference is the presence of an intermediary in the
wholesale channel.
Mortgage lending, if successfully done, is a cash intensive business. With each
loan that is made, money moves out of the accounts of the lenders. The lenders need
a method to replenish their lending capital. Since subprime lenders are not usually
deposit-taking entities, the manner by which subprime lenders raise capital to fund
additional loans, and the second distinct business, is by selling the loans into the
secondary market through a process known as securitization.48 It is impossible to
appreciate how fallout from subprime lending has touched so many different areas of
the economy49 without at least a passing acquaintance with securitization and
collateralized debt obligations (“CDOs”).
Although the intricacies of the mortgage-backed security market are beyond the
scope of this Comment, at its most basic level, securitization involves the packaging
of mortgages into debt securities that back CDOs.50 The debt securities, in this case
mortgages, generate interest.51 Typically, the CDO is divided into different tranches,
ranging from highest to lowest, and a CDO investor can decide whether to own all or
part of one or more of the tranches.52 The “highest” tranche is the most secure because

44. BUS. BANKR. COMM’N, SECTION OF BUS. LAW, AM. BAR ASS’N, THE SUBPRIME LENDING
INDUSTRY: A LOOK AT THE RESTRUCTURING OF MARKET IN TURMOIL (Aug. 11, 2007), available at
www.abanet.org/buslaw/newsletter/0063/materials/pp1a.pdf.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See, e.g., Julie Creswell & Vikas Bajaj, Jittery Stock Market Drops as Mortgage Fallout Spreads,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2007, at C1; Vikas Bajaj & Peter Edmonston, E*Trade Hit By Fallout of Subprime,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2007, at C1; David Prosser, Sub-prime Mortgage Fallout Could Spell Disaster for
Pending Deals, THE INDEPENDENT, Aug. 13, 2007, at A1.
50. Hearing on Protecting Homeowners: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Housing and Community
Opportunity and Subcomm. on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement
of Cameron L. Cowan, Partner, Orrick, Herrington, and Sutcliffe, LLP on behalf of the American
Securitization Forum).
51. See, e.g., United States v. Cioffi, No. 08CR00415, 2008 WL 2448463 (E.D.N.Y. June 18, 2008).
Ralph Cioffi and Matthew Tannin were portfolio managers for two, now collapsed, hedge funds at Bear
Stearns. Id. at ¶¶ 7-8. The two managers were indicted on June 18, 2008, for conspiracy to commit
securities fraud and wire fraud. See generally, Cioffi, 2008 WL 2448463.
52. Id. at ¶ 14.
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it is the last tranche to lose interest—and, in the event of collapse, return of principal
—if “the underlying debtors defaulted on their mortgages.”53 As with most investment
decisions, the safer the investment, the lower the rate of return, and, in the world of
CDOs, the owners of the highest tranche, because it is the safest, are entitled to the
smallest percentage of the interest.54 Conversely, the lowest tranche, or the so-called
“equity tranche,” is the first tranche to lose both interest and principal if the underlying
debtors defaulted on their mortgage, but “[a]s compensation for accepting higher risks,
the owners of the equity tranche holders were entitled to the highest percentage of the
interest rate payments flowing to the CDO.”55
Investors purchase these tranches because they offer a return on investment in the
form of interest payments and return of principal to the holders. As noted, the money
used for payments of the principal and interest due to the holder derives from the cash
flow generated by the assets comprising the security.56 In essence, this means that in
order for the owners of the different tranches to be paid the interest and principal they
are due, the underlying asset, in this case the mortgages, must be generating a revenue
stream. For mortgages, homeowners making their monthly mortgage payments
generate this revenue stream. When one or two homeowners are unable to pay
according to the terms of their mortgage and move into foreclosure, their inability to
pay has virtually no effect on the payment of interest and principal to tranche owners;
in “normal times,” CDOs, particularly the higher tranches, look to be a safe investment.
However, when the foreclosure rate exceeds normal levels, and, in the aggregate,
thousands of homeowners cease to pay their mortgages in favor of foreclosure, this
means that there is not enough money flowing into the CDO to pay the owners. At this
point, the “safe investment” becomes an albatross around the investor’s neck—and on
their balance sheet.
As explained above, when the average homeowner was not defaulting on the terms
of their mortgage, these CDOs seemed to be an appealing investment. For lenders, like
investors, the packaging of mortgages into securities was equally appealing, as it is a
powerful means to generate additional lending capacity. The power of securitization
for a lender is that it allows the financial institution that would normally have to wait
years to realize the full benefits of the obligations owed to it (i.e., repayment of the
loans that it holds) and to immediately realize the value of the obligations through the
sale of the securities into the secondary market.57 Pulling this all together, the reason
that this practice touches so many areas of the economy is because these mortgagebacked CDOs offered a higher-rate of return than many other “safe investments,” so
many investors, including large institutions, pension plans, and even state and
municipal governments, purchased these mortgage-backed bonds.

53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See generally Hearing on Protecting Homeowners: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Housing and
Community Opportunity Subcomm. on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit, 108th Cong. (2003)
(statement of Cameron L. Cowan, Partner, Orrick, Herrington, and Sutcliffe, LLP, on behalf of the
American Securitization Forum).
57. Id.
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However, in order for the purchaser of the tranche to be secure in the fact that they
are going to be repaid with interest (i.e., the basic function of an investment), the asset
stream that is being used to repay the bond obligation must be secure. As noted earlier,
in the case of securities comprised of mortgages, this means that if the original
borrowers are defaulting on their payment obligations under the mortgage, the asset
stream used to pay the interest and principal on the bond will dry up. As a testament
to the power of the mortgage-backed securities market, the “value of the mortgagebacked securities (MBS) issued by the subprime market grew from $11.05 billion in
1994 to $133 billion in 2002.”58
In addition to the dominant subprime loan securitization-market, there is also a
prime mortgage-securitization market. Although not nearly as large as the subprime
market, this market functions in the same manner as the subprime market except that
the bonds and CDOs are both theoretically, and practically, more secure because the
asset underlying the bond is a mortgage to a borrower with a higher credit score. This
higher credit score means that the borrower is more likely to make timely payments
according to the terms of the loan. Until very recently, the prime mortgage
securitization market seemingly has been unscathed by the subprime mortgage fallout.
However, with the recent, very public collapse of a large prime lender, there are signs
that the subprime fallout is spreading into the prime mortgage market as well.59
What becomes apparent is that without reliable information detailing (1) what
mortgages—prime or subprime—and (2) the particular credit-risk of the individual
debtors, it is virtually impossible for investors to make informed decisions regarding
which CDOs and, more specifically, which tranches of the CDO to purchase. To assist
in this process, the different tranches of the CDOs generally received ratings from a
credit rating agency.60 The highest tranches of the CDO generally were rated “AAA”
and, supposedly, carried an “extremely limited risk of default.”61 The lowest, or
equity, tranche oftentimes was unrated.62 However, in the wake of the subprime
meltdown, serious questions need to be posed to determine the criteria the ratings
agencies used to rate the different tranches of the CDOs.

58. Renuart, supra note 17, at 472.
59. See Alex Frangos & Lingling Wei, REIT Lender Thornburg Sees Collateral Seized, THE WALL ST.
J., March 8, 2008, at B1. Thornburg Mortgage is a real estate investment trust (“REIT”). Id. REITs are
real estate investment companies that pay no corporate income taxes as long as they pay ninety percent of
their taxable income to investors as dividends. Id. Several REITs that dealt in subprime loans were among
the first corporate causalities of the subprime mortgage market meltdown in 2007. Id. What makes the
Thornburg Mortgage meltdown unnerving is that Thornburg deals in “safe” mortgages, as evidenced by
their borrowers having an average credit score of 744. Id. According to Larry Goldstone, the chief executive of Thornburg Mortgage, Thornburg’s “portfolio of mortgage backed securities has exhibited exceptional
credit performance and comprises loans that are among the most solid in the industry. Quite simply, the
panic that has gripped the mortgage-financing market is irrational and as no basis in investment reality.”
Id.
60. Cioffi, 2008 WL 2448463, at ¶ 16.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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Various legal changes in the 1980s enabled subprime lending to flourish.63
Included in these changes was elimination of the interest rate ceilings imposed by state
usury laws and the development of a secondary mortgage market, which permitted loan
underwriters to fund subprime mortgages through the capital markets.64 This funding
of mortgages through the capital markets is what has previously been detailed as
“securitization.”65 It is staggering how rapidly the markets accepted these mortgagebacked securities. However, the rapidity becomes less surprising when one considers
that this method of packaging many loans together for sale on the secondary market
provided the lenders with excess capital that ordinarily would not be available to make
additional loans.66 In turn, the additional subprime loans funded by this process are
then packaged together as a security and the process is repeated. As previously noted,
the cash intensive nature of mortgage lending means that subprime lenders were
packaging loans for sale on the secondary market at an ever-increasing rate.67
The fallout from the packaging of subprime loans for sale on the secondary
markets has impacted the United States and world economies in ways that continue to
reveal themselves daily.68 However, looking only to the movement of loans after they
have been funded and sold on the secondary market is just part of the story. As with
most legislation that attempts to regulate the subprime lending industry, Maine’s Act
to Protect Homeowners from Predatory Lending focuses on the behavior of the people
originating the subprime loans: mortgage brokers or mortgage bankers. A reason for
increased focus on the behavior of the brokers and bankers at the point of origin is that
most subprime loans are originated through mortgage companies that are “only weakly
regulated.”69 The absence of regulation is because many mortgage companies are not
deposit-taking institutions and, therefore, not subject to the additional regulatory
structure imposed upon deposit-taking institutions. Thus, a familiarity with the point
of origination for subprime loans is necessary when analyzing Maine’s new legislation.
Companies focusing exclusively on mortgage lending for their business model are
the businesses most likely to be making subprime loans.70 As noted, many of these
companies are not deposit-taking institutions and are “not subject to the safety and
soundness regulations that govern federal or state banks.”71 Many of the brokers

63. MAJORITY STAFF OF THE JOINT ECON. COMM., 110TH CONG., REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
SUBPRIME LENDING CRISIS: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT ON WEALTH, PROPERTY VALUES AND TAX
RETURNS, AND HOW WE GOT HERE 10 (2007).
64. Id. See also EDWARD M. GRAMLICH, SUBPRIME MORTGAGES: AMERICA’S LATEST BOOM OR BUST,
13-18 (2007).
65. Tashman, supra note 9, at 410.
66. Id.
67. MAJORITY STAFF OF THE JOINT ECON. COMM., supra note 63, at 18 (noting that the “percentage of
subprime mortgage securitization . . . reached a peak value of more than 81 percent in 2005”).
68. See, e.g., Vikas Bajaj & Louise Story, Mortgage Crisis Spreads Beyond Subprime Loans, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 12, 2008, at A1; Richard A. Oppel, Jr. & Patrick McGeehan, Lenders Try to Fend Off Laws
on Subprime Lending, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2001, at C1.
69. MAJORITY STAFF OF THE JOINT ECON. COMM., supra note 63, at 17.
70. Id. at 19; see also GRAMLICH, supra note 64, at 7 (concluding that “30 percent of [subprime] loans
are made by subsidiaries of banks and thrifts, less [sic] tightly supervised than their parent company, and
50 percent are made by independent mortgage companies, state-chartered but not subject to much federal
supervision at all”).
71. MAJORITY STAFF OF THE JOINT ECON. COMM., supra note 63, at 18.
ON THE
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working for these mortgage companies can be fairly characterized as “salesmen,”72
and, for reasons detailed below, there may be very little financial73 or legal74 incentive
for these brokers to originate loans that the borrowers objectively are able to afford to
repay.75
The lack of financial incentive to loan money only to borrowers who can afford
full repayment stems from the fact that when a mortgage company packages loans to
sell on the secondary market, there is little direct financial risk to the lender if a
particular borrower defaults on the mortgage payments.76 In effect, with subprime
lending, there is a division between the mortgage originator and the mortgage holder.77
A mortgage originator’s name appears on the loan note, mortgage, and HUD-1
Settlement Statement.78 However, the mortgage holder actually “owns” the mortgage.79
In a number of traditional, bank-funded loans, there exists a unity of interest between
the originator and the holder because they are the same entity, the bank, for the life of
the loan. However, in the subprime market, loans are often sold, and, therefore, some
other entity (the new “holder”) is now financially dependant on the borrower-debtor
making the payments. In most cases, the entity that purchased the mortgage and the
purchaser of the mortgage-backed securities are the only ones exposed to the risk of
default, leaving the point-of-origin lender without consequences for making a so-called
“bad loan.” Generally speaking, considering the limited exposure window because of
the rapid speed at which most loans are sold into the secondary market, if the borrower
defaults after sale of her loan into the secondary market, the point-of-origination lender
will not be adversely affected at all. This means that there is little, if any, financial
incentive to make only so-called “good” loans.
This lack of incentive is a drastic change from the time when a deposit-taking
institutions funded loans and then held the loan for the entire repayment period. In
such a situation, a borrower’s default directly impacted the bottom-line financial
position of the lender. Additionally, should a particular loan officer make a number
of ill-advised loans, the bank itself had the capacity to simply fire her. In short, direct
responsibility for the consequences of a loan default created an incentive for the
traditional lenders to make loans only to individuals who could objectively afford to
repay the loan. This movement away from a directly-incentivized system of loan
origination has suggested to many states that increased scrutiny of the practices
surrounding loan origination in the subprime mortgage market, where a traditional
bank is not involved, is in order.80

72. Id. at 20.
73. Id. As will be explored in Part III of this Comment, many of the indicia of a predatory loan are
methods of selling loans to customers that have less favorable terms than could be provided resulting in
additional fees for the company and a larger paycheck for the broker.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Renuart, supra note 17, at 471.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. According to the National Conference of State Legislatures, the following is a non-exhaustive list
of states, including Maine, with some form of subprime or predatory lending legislation: Arkansas, ARK.
CODE ANN. §§ 23-53-101 to -106 (West 2008); California, CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 4970, 4973 (West 2008);
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Compounding the issues facing regulation of the subprime market is the existence
of several completely legal alternative mortgage products that have become
synonymous with the subprime lending market. Principally among these alternative
mortgage products are hybrid adjustable rate mortgages (“ARMs”).81 Hybrid ARMs
combine a fixed rate for an initial period, usually between two and five years, although
sometimes as long as ten years, with an adjustable rate for the remainder of the life of
the loan.82 According to the Report and Recommendations of the Joint Economic
Committee of Congress, “in the abstract, ARMs need not work to the disadvantage of
borrowers.”83 However, in practice, most subprime ARMs are made to borrowers who
are qualified for the loan on the basis of their ability to pay at the “low initial rate
rather than the reset rate.”84 By simply qualifying borrowers for hybrid loans on the
basis of the initial rate, these lenders make it more probable that a subprime borrower
must “sell, refinance, or default” at the reset of the initial interest rate.85 However, by
the time this interest rate increases, the majority of the loans have already been sold
into the secondary market and, as such, there is no financial incentive to not qualify
borrowers on the basis of the low, introductory mortgage rate.
To appreciate how all these factors, as well as many others, have come together
to fuel the explosive expansion of the subprime market one should note that, according
to the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the subprime lending
industry’s value grew from “$150 billion in 2000 to $650 billion in 2007.”86 Additionally, this rapid growth in the subprime lending market combined and reinforced the

Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 5-3.5-101 to -105, 38-40-105 (West 2008); Connecticut, CONN. GEN.
STAT. §§ 36a-521, -746 to -746(q) (2008); Florida, FLA. STAT. §§ 494.0078-.0097 (2008); Georgia, GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 7-6A-1 to -13 (West 2008); Illinois, 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 137/1 to 137/135 (2008), 765
ILL. COMP. STAT. 77/70 (2008); Indiana, IND. CODE §§ 4-6-12-1 to -10 (2008); Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 286.8-010 to -990, 360.100 (West 2008); Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 6:1096(G),
9:3572.6(C) (2008); Maryland, MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §§ 12-127, 12-311, 12-409.1,12-1029 (West
2008); Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 183C, §§ 1-19 (West 2008); Michigan, MICH. COMP.
LAWS §§ 445.1631-.1645 (2008); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. § 58.137 (2008); Missouri, MO. REV. STAT. §
375.937 (2008); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. § 32-5-306 (2008); Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 45-702,
-704, -705 (2008); Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 598D.010-.150 (2008); New Jersey, §§ N.J. REV. STAT.
46:10B-22 to -35 (2008); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-21A-1 to -14 (West 2008); New York,
N.Y. BANKING LAW § 6 (McKinney 2008); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 24-1.1E, 24-1.1F, 24-10.2,
53-243.01 to .18 (2008); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1322.062, 1322.07, 1322.08, §1345.01 to .44,
1349.25 to .51 (West 2008); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. tit. 14A, §§ 3-204, tit. 59, §§ 2081-2093 (2008);
Pennsylvania, 63 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 456.101 to 456.3101 (2008); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 34-235, 34-25.2-1 to -15 (2008); South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-23-10 to -85 (2008); Tennessee, TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 45-20-101 to 111 (West 2008); Texas, TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. §§ 343.001-.206 (Vernon
2008), and TEX. GOV’T. CODE ANN. §§ 2306.001-.1076 (Vernon 2008); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 61-2d101 to 13 (West 2008); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 6.1-422, 6.1-422.1 (West 2008); Washington, WASH.
REV. CODE §§ 31.04 to .900 (West 2008); West Virginia, W. VA. CODE §§ 31-17-1 to -20 (2008);
Wisconsin, WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 428.202-.211 (West 2008). NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES, PREDATORY MORTGAGE LENDING INTRODUCTION (2008), http://www.ncsl.org/programs/
banking/predlend_intro.htm
81. MAJORITY STAFF OF THE JOINT ECON. COMM., supra note 63, at 2.
82. DICKSTEIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 10.
83. MAJORITY STAFF OF THE JOINT ECON. COMM., supra note 63, at 20.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Tashman, supra note 9, at 407.
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quick appreciation in housing prices that culminated in the foreclosure crisis that the
nation now is facing.87
D. “Subprime” Versus “Predatory”
The generally clear lines of separation between the prime mortgage market and the
subprime mortgage market become much murkier when the divisions between the
legitimate subprime and predatory subprime mortgage markets are explored.88 Thus
far, this Comment has mostly focused on the nature of the entire subprime market,
without regard for the subprime/predatory division. Although it is safe to say that the
predatory market “generally exists” as a subset of the subprime market,89 there remains
a definitional problem between the two markets; this haziness is compounded by the
fact that the legitimate subprime lending market and the predatory lending market too
often simply are grouped together in discussion—a natural byproduct of the latter
being almost entirely a subset of the former.90
Additionally, as noted by Kathleen C. Engel and Patricia A. McCoy, dividing the
legitimate subprime market from the predatory market by trying to define what a
legitimate subprime mortgage loan lacks may have the consequence of framing the
debate over predatory lending practices in terms of the “immorality” of the predatory
lending practice.91 On one side of this moral debate stands the fast-talking, morallyambiguous mortgage broker and on the other, stands the hapless borrower. Or,
depending on how one pictures the responsibility of the borrower, the borrower may
be cast as someone who should have taken more time to understand the implications
of the documents he was signing. In either case, if effective control of predatory
lending practices is the goal of legislation, moving away from a conception of
predatory lending as a moral failure, and its attendant rhetoric is vital.92 In short,
anecdotal evidence of abuses and overreaching does little to advance the goal of
clearly defining and understanding predatory lending.
Although it is true that, in most cases, the predatory loan is a subset of the
subprime loan, they remain, and should continue to remain, “analytically distinct.”93
The historic absence of a clear working definition of a predatory lending practice has
not gone unnoticed.94 The United States General Accounting Office established a
working description of predatory lending as “an umbrella term that is generally used
to describe cases in which a broker or originating lender takes unfair advantage of a

87. MAJORITY STAFF OF THE JOINT ECON. COMM., supra note 63, at 2-3.
88. See generally Engel & McCoy, supra note 28.
89. Renuart, supra note 17, at 476 n.18 (“Prime loans can be predatory, although the likelihood is
smaller in that market.”).
90. Id.
91. MAJORITY STAFF OF THE JOINT ECON. COMM., supra note 63, at 1.
92. Engel & McCoy, supra note 28, at 1260.
93. Id. at 1261.
94. Engel and McCoy note:
In 2000, Senator Phil Gramm, then the chairman of the Senate Banking Committee,
famously asserted that predatory lending could not be addressed until it could be defined.
With that remark, Senator Gramm shrewdly seized on the difficulties in defining predatory
lending, while stoking the flames that have surrounded any attempt at definition.
Id. at 1260-61.
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borrower, often through deception, fraud, or manipulation, to make a loan that contains
terms that are disadvantageous to the borrower.”95 Still others have suggested that
predatory lending is a loan with onerous terms “targeted at naïve borrowers or
otherwise vulnerable populations resulting in devastating loss including foreclosure,
bankruptcy, and poverty.”96 This Comment respectfully suggests that these definitions
may suffer from overly moralistic language.
Instead of looking at features that a legitimate subprime mortgage lacks, a better
method to understand predatory lending may be to examine a loan for those
characteristics that typical predatory loans share. This may serve to more accurately
characterize any particular loan as predatory. From this starting point, one can move
to a more abstract level and define a loan as predatory based on the actual terms of the
loan instead of the means of selling the borrower on the loan or the particular
characteristics of the borrower. Of course, at the base, the term “predatory lending”
is broad enough to encompass abusive lending practices involving fraud, deception,
and unfairness.97 However, indicia of predatory lending are much broader and usually
include one or more of the following characteristics:
•
•

•
•

•

Asset Based Lending: making of unaffordable loans based on the borrower’s
home equity without regard to the borrowers ability to repay the obligation.98
Loan Flipping and Equity Stripping by a broker: inducing a borrower to
repeatedly refinance a loan, even though the refinance transaction is not in the
borrower’s best interest, and charging high points and fees for each refinance,
thereby depleting the homeowner’s equity.99Loan Packing: a loan broker
engages in fraud or deception to conceal the true nature of the loan obligation
from a naïve borrower by bundling credit insurance and other purported debt
protections into loans without consumer’s informed consent.100
Steering: the borrower receives a more expensive loan than he or she could
qualify for accounting for legitimate risk to the lender.101
Abusive Broker Kickbacks: as mortgage brokers have no legal duty to find the
loans that are best suited for borrowers,102 brokers can be compensated in ways
that create incentives to take advantage of borrowers.103
Prepayment Penalties: rare in the conventional mortgage market but a “large
majority” of subprime loans contain prepayment penalty terms.104 However, not
all prepayment terms are necessarily indicative of predatory lending and the

95. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CONSUMER PROTECTION: FEDERAL AND STATE AGENCIES FACE
CHALLENGES IN COMBATING PREDATORY LENDING 18 (2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d04280.pdf.
96. Riley, supra note 11, at *1.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. DICKSTEIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 14.
102. Id.; see also MAJORITY STAFF OF THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., supra note 63, at 20 (noting that
brokers “lack strong legal incentives to act in the interest of borrowers . . . [because] [u]nder state law
brokers are not fiduciaries, who must put the interest of their clients first”).
103. DICKSTEIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 15.
104. Id.
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degree of severity of the penalty will dictate how abusive the actual effect of the
penalty is.105

Despite the fact that subprime loans are distinct from predatory loans insofar as
a legitimate subprime loan lacks any of the indicia of a predatory loan, “the extent to
which the predatory lending has infiltrated the subprime market cannot be known
precisely.”106 Although, “it is rare to find a case of predatory lending that does not
involve a subprime lender, as opposed to a prime lender.”107
The lack of a cohesive definition of what is a predatory loan reveals much about
the fundamental assumptions that underscore the entire area of predatory lending and,
to a certain extent, the greater subprime arena. What is clear is that there is an
asymmetry of knowledge between the lenders and brokers, who have extensive
knowledge about the credit market and products, on one side, and the typical predatory
loan victim, who is generally “unsophisticated” about his options, on the other.108
Generally, the impact of an asymmetry of knowledge need not be necessarily harmful.
Many relationships are in fact necessitated by an asymmetry of knowledge with no
detriment to either party.109 However, in the predatory lending market, the asymmetry
of knowledge has undoubtedly been exploited and may be responsible for the fact that
nationally, predatory lending practices have been most heavily concentrated in lowincome, minority neighborhoods.110 This may be true because these neighborhoods
have traditionally lacked access to both reliable information and conventional credit
markets.
In a decidedly more measurable example of how severe the impact of this
asymmetry of knowledge can be on borrowing decisions, according to a recent Freddie
Mac111 analysis, more than twenty percent of all subprime borrowers in Freddie Mac’s
portfolio could have received a prime mortgage.112 This means that despite being
objectively qualified for a traditional lending product with, likely, a better rate of
interest, two out of every ten borrowers received a subprime mortgage product.113
However, it is unclear from Freddie Mac’s analysis whether the objectively-qualified
prime borrowers given a subprime product who defaulted would have been able to
make the payments under the terms of a traditional mortgage product.

105. Id.
106. David Reiss, Subprime Standardization: How Rating Agencies Allow Predatory Lending to
Flourish in the Secondary Mortgage Market, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 985, 998 (2006).
107. Id. (Internal citations omitted).
108. Engel & McCoy, supra note 28, at 1281.
109. Classic examples of relationships necessitated, at least in part, by an asymmetry of knowledge
include the attorney-client relationship and doctor-patient relationship.
110. See TASK FORCE OF THE COMBINED DEPARTMENTS OF HUD AND TREASURY, CURBING PREDATORY
HOME MORTGAGE LENDING 35 (2000), available at http://www.hud.gov/ utilities/intercept.cfm?/library/
bookshelf12/pressrel/treasrpt.pdf.
111. See FREDDIE MAC, supra note 34.
112. DICKSTEIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 14; see also Mike Hudson & E. Scott Reckard, More
Homeowners with Good Credit getting Stuck with Higher Rate Loans, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2005, at A1.
113. It is unclear from Freddie Mac’s analysis whether the objectively-qualified prime borrowers given
a subprime product who defaulted would have been able to make the payments under the terms of a
traditional mortgage product.
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In addition to the asymmetry of knowledge, or perhaps because of it, the
origination of predatory loans has been labeled a “push” market: a homeowner is
targeted by a broker who wants to sell them on a particular mortgage instead of the
traditional situation of a borrowers seeking out a loan.114 The methods of solicitation
used by brokers include targeting neighborhoods with older and minority homeowners,
steering borrowers into higher-rate loans, face-to-face sales by knocking on doors, and
solicitations by home improvement contractors who will attempt to steer the
homeowner into getting a loan for the “needed” home repair.115 Once the originator
has solicited a homeowner, a number of common practices are employed in the
predatory market. One of the most common practices is to falsify the information of
the borrower, particularly the borrower’s income level.116 Another method that brokers
may utilize to qualify these homeowners for the loan is to “inflate the value of the
home through a partnership with an unscrupulous appraiser.”117 It has even been noted
that “at their worst, lenders or brokers sometimes forge the necessary signatures.”118
These examples can serve as the outliers of the “push” market behavior insofar as the
brokers are forcing unwilling applicants into unwanted loans. However, these
anecdotes about unscrupulous behavior cannot stand as proxies for the greater
subprime market. If anti-predatory lending regulation is built with this type of moral
definition as the foundation, the regulation will sweep far too broadly.
Finally, it must be remembered that there is a range of loan terms that can be
considered perfectly acceptable (i.e., non-predatory) with the simple qualification that
the borrower understands the terms and has the capacity to negotiate for them in an
arm’s-length manner.119 A knowledgeable borrower may make an informed decision
to “purchase points” by paying more upfront in exchange for a lower interest rate, or
decide that a nontraditional mortgage product best suits her needs. Nationally, in the
predatory lending market, it is the absence of “negotiation, transparency, [or] true
understanding” on the part of the borrower that leads to abusive loan terms such as
“high interest rate[s], high fees and closing costs, balloon payments, negative
amortization, high appraisal costs, padded recording fees, back dating of documents,
charges for duplicative services, mandatory credit insurance, or arbitration clauses.”120
Most of these factors, taken in isolation, or properly negotiated for, would not warrant
the “predatory” label. Unfortunately, in many instances of predatory lending, many of
these factors subject the borrower to financing terms that they simply cannot afford.121

114. Renuart, supra note 17, at 480.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 481.
117. Id. This practice of inflating the value of a home in order to qualify a borrower for a loan has drawn
the attention of New York Attorney General Andrew M. Cuomo, who announced that he is suing one of
the nation’s largest real estate appraisal management companies and its parent corporation for colluding
with the largest savings and loan in the country to inflate the appraisal values of homes. See Press Release,
Andrew M. Cuomo (NY Attorney General Sues First American and its Subsidiary for Conspiring with
Washington Mutual to Inflate Real Estate Appraisals) (Nov. 1, 2007) (available at http://www.oag.state.ny.
us/press/2007/nov/nov1a_07.html).
118. Renuart, supra note 17, at 481-82.
119. Id. at 482.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 483.
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The predatory practices do not simply stop when the borrower has signed the
documents and has begun repaying the loan. Some of the common predatory practices
on the back-end of the loan include:
•
•
•

•

•

Failing to post monthly payments received from borrowers so that additional
fees may be collected;122
Using so-called “suspense accounts” to hold the loan payments which can also
result in additional fees and penalties;123
Delaying credits and adjustments to the homeowner’s escrow account, which
results in an unnecessary increase in the homeowner’s monthly escrow
payment;124
Conducting multiple, unnecessary “drive-by” property inspections when the
homeowner is not in default and then imposing a charge for each “inspection”;125
and
Improperly calculating interest on open-ended lines of credit or variable rate
loans.126

In short, once a borrower becomes entangled in the web of a predatory loan, she
is often left with no choice other than to go into foreclosure. When, for this limited
purpose, we include predatory loans in the larger category of subprime loans, it helps
explain one of the reasons why “the rate at which loans go into foreclosure is
significantly higher in the subprime market than the prime market.”127
E. Maine’s Subprime Market
Keeping in mind the sharp distinction between the legitimate subprime mortgage
market and the predatory mortgage market, the subprime lending market in Maine has
been characterized by rapid growth and has thus trended with the rest of the nation on
this front.128 Between 2000 and 2003, the gross number of Maine’s mortgage loans
originated by subprime lenders increased from 2,328 to 7,170, an increase of 208
percent.129 Additionally, mortgage refinances accounted for the bulk of the increase
in originations of subprime loans, “growing from 1,645 in 2000 to 5,977 in 2003, an
increase of 263 percent.”130 Within the limited category of mortgage refinances, the
Maine mortgage market trended higher than the national average when it came to cashout refinances.131 In fact, “Mainers obtain[ed] a higher percentage of their subprime
loans in the form of cash-out refinances than [did] borrowers in any other state.”132 In
contrast, Maine had the lowest percentage of subprime mortgage lending used for

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. at 484.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 485.
Id. at 478.
DICKSTEIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 9.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 10.
Id.
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actual home purchases.133 Carla Dickstein, Hannah Thomas, and Uriah King noted that
the disparity between subprime lending used for cash-out refinances versus lending
used to purchase a home is “consistent with Maine’s high home ownership rate, rising
property values in many parts of the state, rising consumer debt, pockets of economic
distress, and aging population.”134
Again, Maine is within the national average, as sixty percent of Maine’s subprime
loans consist of alternative mortgage products.135 As expected from the national data,
the “vast majority of these alternative mortgages are hybrid adjustable rate
mortgages”136 that have already been noted to potentially work a serious hardship on
borrowers when the period of fixed-rate interest ends and the borrower is faced with
the necessity of selling, refinancing, or defaulting.137 Finally, in keeping with the
national trend, the “Maine subprime market is largely dominated by non-bank lenders
and mortgage brokers.”138
As disturbing as it is, as many as fifteen percent of Maine borrowers who received
a subprime loan could have qualified for a prime loan.139 Although there was no
attempt to characterize the severity of the asymmetry of knowledge exploitation in
Maine compared to the national market, the fact that fifteen percent of borrowers who
would otherwise qualify for conventional loans ultimately received a subprime
mortgage product suggests that the asymmetry of knowledge problem that
characterizes subprime lending across the United States is no less prevalent in Maine.
Certainly, this asymmetry of knowledge is at least partially responsible for the fact that
there is a concentration of subprime lending in the more rural portions of the state.140
When dealing with any area of a state that lacks consistent and reliable access to
information, the lesson seems to be that any asymmetry of knowledge has the potential
to work a greater hardship on that population. Within more urban states, poorer
pockets of neighborhoods have the most subprime-steering and predatory lending.
Furthermore, in a rural state such as Maine, it is the most rural areas of the state that
shoulder the burden of subprime lending.
However, the fact that fifteen percent of Mainers ended up with a subprime
mortgage product despite being objectively qualified for a prime mortgage is not
inexplicable when the inherent asymmetry of knowledge is coupled with the fact that,
in Maine, mortgage brokers, unlike loan officers in banks, do not owe the borrower any
fiduciary duty. Although the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court,
has made it clear that a fiduciary relationship may exist between a bank loan officer

133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See MAJORITY STAFF OF THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., supra note 63, at 21.
138. DICKSTEIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 7.
139. Id. at 18. This percentage was generated by determining the number of borrowers who would
qualify under the secondary market purchasing guidelines yet ended up with subprime loans. Id. The three
major criteria for qualifying for a prime mortgage under these guidelines are: (1) a FICO score greater than
660; (2) full documentation of income; and (3) a loan amount less than the maximum size loan that Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac are allowed to purchase. Id.
140. Id. at 11.

306

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:1

and a borrower,141 the court has stopped short of finding a similar responsibility in the
relationship between a broker and a borrower. In practice, however, it is unlikely that
simply finding a fiduciary relationship between a mortgage broker and a client would
solve the predatory lending problem. Perhaps the easiest way to understand why
finding a fiduciary relationship between a mortgage broker and a borrower would not
solve the predatory lending problem is to examine, conversely, why finding a fiduciary
relationship between a loan officer at a brick-and-mortar bank and a borrower has
worked to protect borrowers from abusive lending practices.
In a traditional lending situation, the loan officer working at a bank stands as an
agent for the bank itself. A clear principal-agent relationship has been established by
virtue of the loan officer’s employment. This clear agency relationship means that if
the loan officer were to breach her fiduciary duty to the potential borrower, those
improper actions would be imputed onto the bank itself. Because the bank as a whole
would be responsible for any remedy fashioned by a court, the borrower could be made
whole again in the event of a breach.142
We can now contrast this clear agency relationship with the relationships in the
subprime arena to see why finding a fiduciary relationship would likely not have an
appreciable impact on predatory lending practices in Maine. A broker serving in his
traditional role is not an agent for any one particular lender: the “purest” (and largely
theoretical) function of a mortgage broker is to search for the best loan terms available
for the particular borrower. As the “pure” broker is not an agent for any one lender,
in the event of a predatory loan, even if the borrower can articulate and prove a theory
of liability, the remedies available to make the borrower whole again are extremely
limited. Most likely, the broker is not going to have the resources available to satisfy
any money judgment and the particular lender will be under no obligation to restructure the onerous loan, nor make restitution for payments already made, as they
may not have an agency relationship with the particular broker.
This lack of an appropriate remedy is the first problem with finding a fiduciary
relationship between a broker and a borrower. However, in practice, most mortgage
brokers actually work for one particular lender as opposed to “searching” for the best
possible loan terms. If a plaintiff could clear the evidentiary hurdle of establishing an
agency relationship between the mortgage broker and a particular lender, the plaintiffborrower and the court will still face the difficulty of trying to fashion an appropriate
remedy, as it is likely that, because of sale into the secondary market, a completely
different business entity from the named defendant (i.e., the entity that originally
funded the loan) would then own the loan. This creates the paradox that the entity
trying to foreclose on a home because of missed payments may not be the defendant
in the litigation by the same homeowner under foreclosure. These practical difficulties
in fashioning effective remedies are what stand in the way of the Law Court simply
finding a fiduciary relationship between the mortgage broker and the client as a
solution to the predatory lending problem.

141. Morris v. Resolution Trust Corp., 622 A.2d 708, 712 (Me. 1993).
142. Potential remedies include re-structuring of the terms of the loan or restitution of payments already
made under the onerous loan.
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F. Crossing Over the Predatory Lending Line in Maine
There are several factors that are unique to Maine’s population that make Maine
particularly vulnerable to predatory lending tactics.143 One factor is that Maine has the
sixth highest homeownership rate in the country.144 Additionally, “Maine is the oldest
state in the country in terms of residents’ median age, and is in the bottom half of states
in terms of median income.”145 This means that many Mainers are “house- and landrich, but cash poor.”146 When a declining economy particularly impacting rural
communities is combined with these factors, it can “provide conditions for predatory
lending practices to flourish and strip equity from borrowers and their communities.”147
In the past, Maine has responded to the threat from predatory lending with both
legal proceedings and legislative enactments. In 2003, Maine’s Attorney General,
along with the Attorneys General from forty-seven other states, brought a predatory
lending lawsuit against two subprime lenders, Beneficial Finance Corporation and
Household Finance Corporation.148 The settlement resolving the suit resulted in a $484
million repayment, with Maine borrowers qualifying for $1.6 million in payouts for
loans made between January 1999 and September 2002.149 Also in 2003, the Maine
Legislature passed Public Law 49, "An Act To Enhance Consumer Protections in
Relation to Certain Mortgages," with the purpose of curbing predatory lending.150 The
law essentially codified the federal Home Ownership and Protection Act of 1994 into
the Maine Consumer Credit Code with a few additional protections for “high-cost”
loans.151 However, there were clear indications that predatory lending practices were
continuing in Maine despite the introduction Public Law 49.152 A 2005 review of the
mortgage foreclosure records at the Cumberland and Lincoln County Registries of
Deeds indicated multiple refinances within a short period of time with no reduction in
the interest rate; this being classic evidence of loan flipping.153

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
those

DICKSTEIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 5.
Id. at 6.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 6.
Id.
See L.D. 494 (121st Legis. 2003).
DICKSTEIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 6. “High-cost” loans were defined by the Public Law 49 as
with interest rates in excess of eight percent over U.S. Treasury Security Yields for fixedrate closed-end loans . . . and in excess of ten percent above U.S. Treasury Yields . . . for
open-ended loans, and/or fees over eight percent of the total loan amount for either closedor open-ended loans.

Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 19. There is a limitation on how probative this evidence is of “loan flipping” and a true
assessment would require a review of every borrower’s loan documentation and loan history. Id. at 19 n.29.
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III. MAINE’S 2007 ANTI-PREDATORY LENDING LEGISLATION
AND THE EMERGENCY AMENDMENT
A. The 2007 Act to Protect Maine’s Homeowners from Predatory Lending
Although the titled purpose of this legislation is to “protect Maine’s homeowners
from predatory lending,” the legislation goes well beyond simply attacking the indicia
of predatory lending and, instead, makes significant changes to the Maine Consumer
Credit Code—Truth-in-Lending Act.154 After passage of the Original Act, the bill’s
primary sponsor, Senator Glenn Cummings, stated that the measure “will make Maine
a national leader in the fight to protect homeowners and stop predatory lending
practices that have led to climbing home foreclosures in Maine and across the
country.”155 Senator Cummings, further said:
The subprime lending crisis has revealed a large crack in the foundation of our
communities. Too many Maine homeowners have found themselves at risk of
predatory lenders who have turned the American dream into a nightmare. Too many
families have lost their homes, their roots in the community, and their life’s
savings—all with nothing more than the stroke of a pen. With the signing of this new
law we are putting Maine consumers and businesses on a more equal playing field.156

Proponents of the new legislation claimed widespread support, noting that, in
addition to garnering unanimous support in both the Maine’s House and Senate,
Maine’s new anti-predatory lending act was supported by more than thirty different
groups.157 It seems plausible that the broad-based support that the Original Act
received was, at least in part, a reaction to the larger subprime meltdown in the national
market. In short, popular sentiment seemed to be that something needed to be done.
It is likely that the primary supporters of the Original Act viewed the greater subprime
mortgage meltdown as a blessing when it came to ushering the Original Act through
the Maine Legislature. The national subprime mortgage meltdown likely made it

154. Compare title 9-A of the Maine Revised Statutes Annotated as of January 1, 2007 with title 9-A
of the Maine Revised Statutes Annotated as of January 1, 2008.
155. Press Release, Glenn Cummings, Maine Speaker of the House, Homeowner Protection Act Makes
Maine a Leader in the Fight to Stop Predatory Lending (June 11, 2007) (available at http://speaker.maine.
gov/HOPA/index.html).
156. Id.
157. Press Release, Coastal Enterprises, Inc., Maine Legislature Passes Model Anti-Predatory Lending
Bill (June 11, 2007) (available at http://www.ceimaine.org/images/stories/pdf/predsigningpr6-07.pdf). The
listed supporters of the Maine Homeowner Protection Act are: AARP Maine; Coastal Enterprises, Inc.;
Common Cause/Maine; Disability Rights Center; Elder Law Section, Maine State Bar Association; Four
Directors Development Corporation, Orono; Independence Living Group, Veazie; Interfaith Maine; Legal
Services for the Elderly; League of Young Voters/Maine; MaineStream Finance, Bangor; Maine
Association of Agencies on Aging; Maine Association of Community Action Programs; Maine Association
of Community Banks; Maine Association of Interdependent Neighborhoods; Maine Association of Realtors;
Maine Bankers Association; Maine Credit Union League; Maine Center for Economic Policy; Maine
Christian Policy Institute; Maine Council of Churches; Maine Council of Senior Citizens; Maine
Developmental Disabilities Council; Maine Equal Justice Partners; Maine Islands Coalition; Modular Home
Builders Association; Maine People’s Alliance; Maine Personal Assistance Services Association, Norway;
Maine Rural Partners; Maine State Employees Association/SEIU Local 1989; Maine State Housing
Authority; Maine Woman’s Lobby; McLaughlin Financial Group, Yarmouth; National Lawyers Guild,
Maine Chapter; NAACP/Portland Branch; NAACP/Bangor Branch; Roman Catholic Diocese of Portland.
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easier to “sell” the Original Act. As such, it can be reasonably posited that, but for the
larger subprime mortgage crisis controlling the headlines of most newspapers for the
past two years, it is unlikely that the Original Act, in its engrossed form, would have
garnered the unanimous support that it did. Although, through the Emergency Act, the
Maine Legislature quickly amended the most obvious problems with the Original
Act,158 it is likely that a more robust debate, free from the ancillary concerns of the
national subprime meltdown, would have produced a more narrowly-tailored piece of
legislation in the first place.
Instead of a robust initial debate capable of producing a more tightly drafted piece
of legislation, this Comment is left asking the Maine Legislature to further narrow the
scope of the Original Act to mitigate any additional damage, by enacting a number of
additional amendments. However, for the moment, this Comment simply will explore
the scope of the Original Act and the subsequently enacted Emergency Amendment
and its second amendment, and, only after, suggest ways that the Original Act should
be further amended.
B. The Original Act and the Emergency Amendment
The Maine Legislature structured the Original Act to impose differing standards
on lenders depending on whether they were making a “residential mortgage loan” or
a “high-rate, high-fee mortgage” loan. Conceptually, the “high-rate, high-fee”
mortgage is merely a subset in the broader category of residential mortgages, however,
in practice, the high-rate, high-fee mortgage shares many of the indicia of a subprime,
or even predatory loan, detailed earlier in this Comment. Under the Original Act, the
broad category of a “residential mortgage loan,” which was not defined in title 9-A of
the Maine Statutes prior to the passage of the Original Act, means an extension of
credit, including an open-end credit plan, in which:
(1) The loan does not exceed the maximum original principal obligation set forth in
and from time to time adjusted according to the provisions of 12 United States
Code, Section 1454(a)(2);
(2) The loan is considered a federally related mortgage loan as set forth in 24 Code
of Federal Regulations, Section 3500.2;
(3) The loan is not a reverse mortgage transaction or a loan made primarily for
business, agricultural or commercial purposes; and
(4) The loan is not a construction loan.159

It is significant that, under the Original Act, none of the new regulation
surrounding residential mortgage lending was dependant upon there actually being
high fees, high rates, high interest or the presence of other indicia of predatory lending.
In effect, under the Original Act, the new regulations apply in blanket fashion to
lending in all three areas (i.e., prime, legitimate subprime, and predatory) of the
residential mortgage lending market. Although there may be additional regulations
placed on the high-rate, high-fee loans, these blanket regulations literally rewrote the

158. See infra Part III.B.
159. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A, § 8-103 (West 2008).
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lending laws of Maine, despite purportedly setting out to address the predatory lending
problem in Maine.
As the Original Act can be accurately seen to address many of the traditional
indicia of predatory lending under the blanket regulations applicable to the making of
any and all residential mortgage loans, regardless of whether the loan independently
qualifies as a high-rate, high-fee loan, the Act cuts a broader swath than needed. For
example, without regard to the actual terms of the loan, the Original Act prohibits a
number of different acts and procedures including:
A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

A creditor may not recommend or encourage default on an existing loan . . .
prior to and in connection with the closing or planned closing of a residential
mortgage loan that refinances all or any portion of the existing loan or debt;160
A creditor may not knowingly or intentionally engage in the act or practice of
flipping a residential mortgage loan.161 The administrator shall adopt rules
defining with reasonable specificity the requirements for compliance with this
paragraph. Rules adopted pursuant to this paragraph are routine technical rules
pursuant to Title 5, chapter 375, subchapter 2-A;162
A borrower may not be charged for a late payment unless the loan documents
specifically authorize the charge, the charge is not imposed unless the payment
is past due for 10 days or more and the charge does not exceed 5% of the amount
of the late payment. A late payment charge may not be imposed more than once
with respect to a particular late payment. If a late payment charge is deducted
from a payment made on the residential mortgage loan and that deduction results
in a subsequent default on a subsequent payment, a late payment charge may not
be imposed for that default. A creditor or servicer may apply any payment made
in the order of maturity to a prior period’s payment due even if the result is late
payment charges accruing on subsequent payments due;163
A residential mortgage loan may not contain a provision that permits the
creditor, in its sole discretion, to accelerate the indebtedness. This paragraph
does not prohibit the acceleration of the loan in good faith due to the borrower’s
failure to abide by the material terms of the loan;164
A creditor making a residential mortgage loan may not finance directly or
indirectly any credit life, credit disability, credit unemployment or credit
property insurance or any other life or health insurance or any payments directly
or indirectly for any debt cancellation or suspension agreement or contract,
except that insurance premiums or debt cancellation or suspension fees
calculated and paid on a monthly basis or through regularly scheduled periodic
payments may not be considered financed by the creditor;165

160. See id. § 8-206-D(1)(A).
161. The Maine Legislature defined “[f]lipping a residential mortgage loan” as
the making of a residential mortgage loan to a borrower that refinances an existing
residential mortgage loan when the new loan does not have reasonable, tangible net benefit
to the borrower considering all of the circumstances, including, but not limited to, the terms
of both the new and refinanced loans, the cost of the new loan and the borrower’s
circumstances.
See id. § 8-103(1-A)-(P).
162. See id. § 8-206-D(1)(B).
163. See id. § 8-206-D(1)(C).
164. See id. § 8-206-D(1)(D).
165. See id. § 8-206-D(1)(E).
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A borrower may not be charged a fee in addition to the actual public discharge
fee to provide a release upon prepayment. Payoff balances must be provided in
accordance with section 9-305-B.166

It is precisely the broad-based application of these additional regulations to all types
of residential lending in Maine that is most concerning. If the Maine Legislature
wanted a complete overhaul of Maine’s lending laws, the case should have been made
for a rewrite at the onset instead of casting the issue in terms of regulating predatory
lending only to produce a piece of legislation that literally rewrote the entire book.
Thankfully, the legislature realized the most obvious of their mistakes and rushed
to enact an Emergency Amendment in a belated attempt to narrow the scope of the
legislation.167 Of particular concern to the Maine Legislature when enacting the
Emergency Amendment was the broad application of the above-quoted anti-flipping
provision.168 Under the Maine rules pursuant to the Original Act, this provision would
have required the so-called “tangible net benefit” paperwork to be included in the loan
packages of even the safest (i.e., prime) loans.169 The problem created by requiring the
tangible net benefit paperwork for a prime loan is that failure to do this paperwork has
dramatic legal implications.
In effect, the tangible net benefit paperwork is an “analysis of the transaction—
comparing the new and old loans’ monthly payments, interest rates and other
factors—to determine that the borrower will get some financial benefit from the loan”
that the lender will review with the borrower prior to making the loan.170 From a stance
that purely seeks to protect borrowers, this type of requirement may make some sense
and, at the very least, it would force borrowers and lenders to engage in a frank
discussion over the impact of the loan on the borrowers.
Unfortunately, in practice, the legal impact of this requirement is far too broad as
a failure to prepare or review the tangible net benefit paperwork with the borrower can
lead to both primary liability for the original lender and secondary liability for any

166. See id. § 8-206-D(1)(F).
167. See L.D. 2125 (123rd Legis. 2008), which provided
Whereas some of the provisions of Public Law 2007, chapter 273, which enacted restrictions
on predatory lending practices took effect on January 1, 2008; . . . [and] there are a number
of questions regarding the intent of that Act that need to be clarified as quickly as possible
to avoid future problems in lending practices; . . . in the judgment of the Legislature, these
facts create an emergency within the meaning of the Constitution of Maine and require the
following legislation as immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace,
health and safety.
Id.
168. P.L. 2007, ch. 471, § 11 (effective Jan. 1, 2008).
169. See Me. Dep’t. of Prof. and Fin. Reg., 02-029 CMR 144-1, which provides
A creditor may not knowingly or intentionally make a residential mortgage loan to a borrower who
refinances an existing residential mortgage loan when the new residential mortgage loan does not have
reasonable, tangible net benefit to the borrower, considering all of the circumstances, including, but not
limited to, the terms of both the new and refinanced loans, the cost of the new loan and the borrower’s
circumstances.
Id.
170. Edward D. Murphy, Legislators rush to fix lending law, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Jan. 13, 2008,
at F1.
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entity that may purchase that loan on the secondary market.171 This means that if a
broker in Maine fails to prepare or review the tangible net benefit paperwork with a
prime borrower, and then that loan is sold into the secondary markets, any entity that
purchases the loan to package into a security will be exposed to liability should the
original borrower sue. The secondary market for home loans (i.e., the market dealing
in securitization) is understandably hesitant to accept any additional risk in an already
tumultuous market. Because of this risk aversion, the mortgages from Maine requiring
the tangible net benefit paperwork would likely have been shunned by investors. This
is especially so in the prime mortgage securitization market because it exposed buyers
to legal liability for purchasing even the safest of mortgages.172 This aversion to
purchasing “tangible net benefit” loans on the secondary market could in turn mean
that Maine lenders would have a hard time generating additional funds to make new
loans. This aversion could have dried up the Maine mortgage market entirely.
However, even the less dramatic scenario of this requirement—drying up funding for
prime mortgages alone—should signal to the reader that the legislature drastically
overstepped its stated goal of curbing predatory lending when it enacted the Original
Act: prime mortgage lending stands, by definition, in direct opposition to predatory
lending. Where predatory lending is marked by onerous loan terms and overreaching,
prime lending is marked by fair credit terms and arms-length negotiation. Where
predatory lending is marked by foreclosures, prime lending is marked by timely
payments. As such, warning bells about the scope of a piece of legislation meant to
curb predatory lending should sound when that same piece of legislation could have
a dramatic impact on prime lending. In fact, this Comment suggests that alarm bells
should sound when legislation has the potential to impact prime lending in Maine at
all and not simply when people start speaking in terms of a drastic impact.
It was with these concerns in mind that the Maine Legislature enacted the
Emergency Amendment in an attempt to exempt prime mortgages from the ambit of
the tangible net benefit paperwork requirement. The Emergency Act amended section
8-106-D, subsection 1, paragraph B, such that it now reads:
A creditor may not knowingly or intentionally engage in the act or practice of flipping
a residential mortgage loan when making a subprime mortgage loan. The administration shall adopt rules defining with reasonable specificity the requirements for
compliance with this paragraph. Rules adopted pursuant to this paragraph are routine
technical rules pursuant to Title 5, chapter 375, subchapter 2-A.173

Through the Emergency Amendment, the Maine Legislature excluded the requirement
of a tangible net benefit from prime mortgage arena by narrowing the application to
instances of “making a subprime loan.” “Subprime mortgage loan” is separately
defined by the Original Act, as amended by the Emergency Amendment, to include “a
residential mortgage loan that is either a nontraditional mortgage as defined by
paragraph T or a rate spread home loan as defined in paragraph V.”174

171. Id. (“The so-called ‘tangible net benefit’ paperwork could transfer some legal liability to the buyers
on the secondary market, said Chris Pinkham, who heads the Community Bankers Association.”).
172. Under the terms of the Original Act, this paperwork would have been required even for prime loans.
173. See P.L. 2007, ch. 471, § 11 (effective Jan. 1, 2008) (emphasis added).
174. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A, § 8-103(1-A) (West 2008). Paragraph T provides:
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By exempting prime loans from the tangible net benefit paperwork requirement,
the Maine Legislature displayed a refreshing willingness to re-examine past
assumptions in an effort to craft a better piece of legislation. As noted earlier, even
though the size of the securitization market of prime loans is dwarfed by the size of the
securitization market for subprime loans, the prime securitization market still serves
an important function in the greater economy. If the prime mortgage lenders in Maine
were to lose access to the prime mortgage funding advantages that prime-mortgage
securitization provides because the national markets were too risk-adverse to accept
prime mortgages from Maine, it would work a genuine hardship on the borrowers
considered the most credit-worthy.
Moreover, there existed no discernable reason why the Maine Legislature should
have injected this additional risk into the prime mortgage arena. This fact alone adds
more weight to the suggestion that, but for the national subprime mortgage crisis
making headlines, it is unlikely that the Maine Legislature would have enacted such a
drastic overhaul. Thankfully, the legislature reacted quickly enough that, in all
likelihood, there will not be any appreciable economic fallout from this overstep.
However, even as amended, the “tangible net benefit” still casts a wide net over
many types of loans, some of which are surely members of the legitimate subprime
market. While the legislature should be commended for exempting prime loans, they
should be prodded to be faithful to their original goal of curbing predatory lending.
As explored earlier in this Comment, there is a real difference between the legitimate
subprime market and the predatory market, and this difference should be respected by
the legislature.
Notably, the State of Maine Office of Consumer Credit Regulation (the Office)
was skeptical about this drastic reformulation of lending laws in Maine before the
passage of the Original Act. The Office specifically raised concerns about the value
of including a “net tangible benefit” provision into the 2007 Original Act.175 This
skepticism was not based solely on the wide net that the anti-flipping provision cast,
but also to the practical difficulties associated with applying the test. According to the
Office, “[I]n the abstract a net tangible benefit test seems simple to determine and
easily enforced. . . . However, this type of test would add a level of subjectivity to the
lending process, and both lenders and loan brokers are united in strong opposition to

“Nontraditional mortgage" has the same meaning as those mortgages described in the
"Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risks" issued September 29,
2006 and published in 71 Federal Register, 58609 on October 4, 2006 and as updated from
time to time except that “nontraditional mortgage” does not include a mortgage that does
not allow a borrower to defer repayment of principal or interest.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A, § 8-103(1-A)(T) (West 2008).
Paragraph V states:
“Rate spread home loan" means any loan for which the rate spread must be reported under
the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975, Regulation C, 12 Code of Federal Regulations,
Section 203.4(a)(12); and any loan that meets the criteria of a high-rate, high-fee mortgage.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A, § 8-103(1-A)(V) (West 2008) (emphasis added).
175. STATE OF MAINE OFFICE OF CONSUMER CREDIT REGULATION, LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS TO
ADDRESS PREDATORY LENDING PRACTICES IN MAINE 13 (Dec. 8, 2006), available at http://www.maine.gov/
tools/whatsnew/attach.php?id=26818&an=1.
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the measure.”176 It seems clear that the Office believed a more effective way to
approach the predatory lending problem in Maine was to design a piece of legislation
narrowly tailored to the predatory loan problem. By crafting rules that could be
applied objectively, the legislature could have attacked the predatory lending
problem—the stated objective of the legislation—while minimizing the disruption to
the larger lending market. Instead, the legislature saw fit to craft subjective standards,
such as the tangible net benefit paperwork, that, in fact, increase the likelihood of
disruption.
Finally, the Office also noted that “it is important to remember that tools already
exist [prior to passage of the Original Act] to address the patterns of unconscionable
lending behavior” because the Maine statutes allow for investigation into any lenders
making “unfair,” “deceptive” or “abusive” loans.177
In conclusion, the Maine Legislature was on notice that using the tools in place
prior to the adoption of the Original Act “tailored to the specific instances or trends
discovered in this State, may prove both more flexible and more effective than
statutory changes . . . .”178 It is hoped that the legislature will now heed the warning
and scale back the impact of the Original Act.
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FURTHER NARROWING THE SCOPE OF THE ORIGINAL ACT
A. Apply the Tangible Net Benefit Provision Exclusively to
High-Rate, High-Fee Loans
As noted, the Maine Legislature may be commended for narrowing the application
of the tangible net benefit paperwork to exclude prime loans from its reach. However,
the legislation, even after the amendment, still applies the requirement of a tangible net
benefit to both the legitimate subprime and illegitimate predatory markets. The
problem associated with drying up the credit markets in Maine previously discussed
in reference to the prime lending market applies with equal force to the legitimate
subprime lending market. As such, the same logic dictates removing legitimate
subprime loans from the tangible net benefit requirements. Foremost among these
concerns is that, at least arguably, the subprime secondary market cannot absorb an
increased level of risk. The same secondary market liability that was shunned in the
prime arena will likely also be shunned in the subprime secondary market.
It is possible to accept the premise that, the Maine Legislature should remove
legitimate subprime loans from the tangible net benefit requirement, yet be left with
the question of how to separate the legitimate subprime market from the illegitimate

176. Id.
177. Id. at 14. Lenders and brokers may retain their licenses only so long as they operate their businesses
“fairly.” See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A, §§ 2-302(2), 10-201 (West 2008). Furthermore, the administrator,
by regulation or order, shall prohibit acts or practices in connection with: A. Mortgage loans
that the administrator finds unfair [or] deceptive . . . ; and B. Refinancing of mortgage loans
that the administrator finds are associated with abusive lending practices or that are
otherwise not in the interest of the borrowing public.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A, § 8-206-A(16) West (2008).
178. STATE OF MAINE OFFICE OF CONSUMER CREDIT REGULATION, supra note 175, at 14.
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predatory market. In essence the question becomes: “How can we, in a principled
manner, ferret out predatory loans and subject them to restrictions without simply
casting a net over the entire subprime arena?” Fortunately, the Maine Legislature has
already begun the process by legislating thresholds that, when exceeded, turn a
common residential loan into a “high-rate, high-fee mortgage.”179 Under the Original
Act, a high-rate, high-fee mortgage exceeds the following points and fees threshold:
(2) The total points and fees threshold, which is:
(a)
For loans in which the total loan amount is $40,000 or more, the point at
which the total points and fees payable in connection with the residential
mortgage loan less any excluded points and fees exceed 5% of the total
loan amount; and
(b) For loans in which the total loan amount is less than $40,000, the point
at which the total points and fees payable in connection with the
residential mortgage loan less any excluded points and fees exceed 6% of
the total loan amount.180

In effect, by legislating these thresholds, the Maine Legislature has already made a
policy decision that loans exceeding the above-quoted limits should be subject to
additional scrutiny.181 This Comment suggests that the reason that the Legislature saw

179. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A, § 8-103(1-A)(FF) (West 2008).
180. Id.
181. There are a range of additional requirements placed on lenders making high-rate, high-fee
mortgages. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A, § 8-206-C West (2008). The following is a non-exhaustive list
of some of the additional requirements, above and beyond the generally applicable requirements now in
effect under the Original Act, that apply when making a high-rate, high-fee loan:
1. The making of a high-rate, high-fee mortgage is subject to the following prohibitions
...
A. In connection with a high-rate, high-fee mortgage, a creditor may not directly or
indirectly finance any points or fees.
B. A prepayment fee or penalty may not be included in the loan documents or
charged under the terms of a high-rate, high-fee mortgage.
C. A high-rate, high-fee mortgage may not contain a scheduled payment that is
more than twice as large as the average of earlier scheduled payments. . . .
E. A high-rate, high-fee mortgage may not contain a provision that increases the
interest rate after default. . . .
G. A creditor may not make a high-rate, high-fee mortgage without first receiving
certification from a counselor with a 3rd-party, nonprofit organization approved
by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, a housing
financing agency of this State or the Bureau of Consumer Credit Protection that
the borrower has received counseling on the advisability of the loan transaction.
...
I.
All high-rate, high-fee mortgage documents that create a debt or pledge property
as collateral must contain the following notice on the first page in a conspicuous
manner: “Notice: This is a high-rate, high-fee mortgage subject to special rules
under state law. Purchasers or assignees of this high-rate, high-fee mortgage may
be liable for all claims and defenses by the borrower with respect to the highrate, high-fee mortgage.”
Id. The litany of additional requirements includes a notice provision (I), a creditor counseling provision
(G), a restriction on pre-payment fees (B), and a ban on the lender financing any of the points or fees (A).
Id. Taken as a whole, these additional requirements make it unattractive for lenders to write high-rate, highfee mortgages as well as serving to educate any potential borrower about the dangers of these types of loans.
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fit to impose additional requirements (i.e., the notice provision, the creditor counseling
provision, a restriction on pre-payment fees, and a ban on the lender financing any of
the points or fees) is because it is when entering the realm of high-rate, high-fee
mortgages that the dangers of predatory lending become evident. By identifying a
class of loan terms with the potential to be so onerous to the borrower that the lender
and borrower must take additional steps to close the loan, the Legislature has, in effect,
identified a principled means to separate predatory loans from legitimate subprime
loans.
When taken as a whole, the additional restrictions placed on a high-rate, high-fee
loan serve to force the type of dialogue between a lender and a borrower (that we
would hope is happening even without the legislation) while also independently
ensuring that the borrower is provided access to reliable information about the loan by
requiring that they take a credit education class. This education for the borrower may
serve to reduce some of the asymmetry of knowledge that has formed the basis for
some of the abuses in the predatory lending arena.
The Maine Legislature should engage in a more focused debate on objective
means to identify loans with terms so burdensome that they should be subject to
additional requirements. Perhaps the current thresholds strike the appropriate balance
and no adjustment is needed. However, the next step is to further amend the Original
Act to have the “tangible net benefit” apply only to those loans that exceed the highrate, high-fee threshold and then engage in a debate to set those thresholds.
There are at least three advantages to amending the Original Act in this fashion.
First, and by far the most important, is that amending the Original Act to have the
tangible net benefit only apply to high-rate, high-fee loans would actually be focused
on accomplishing the stated goal of the Original Act—protecting homeowners from
predatory lending—without impacting either prime or legitimate subprime lending.
This is of paramount importance because, as noted, if the legislature feels that a
complete overhaul of mortgage lending in Maine is needed, it should allow the debate
to be broad enough to touch on all the issues before passing the measure. By framing
the debate in terms of predatory lending, the legislature silenced legitimate concerns
that would have been raised had it been clear that such a radical overhaul of the entire
lending industry in Maine was impending.
Quite simply, no one supports predatory lending; unanimous support in opposition
to predatory lending is unremarkable. However, the Original Act went much further
than simply trying to attack predatory lending and the Legislature should correct this
overstep.
The second and third advantages in narrowing the Original Act involve the
prevention the secondary mortgage market shunning Maine-based legitimate subprime
mortgages. This one principle has two equally important, but conceptually distinct,
advantages: (1) having Maine mortgages accepted into the secondary market prevents
Maine credit markets from drying-up, which allows lenders to make additional
legitimate subprime loans to deserving borrowers; and (2) by identifying those loans
that are truly risky (those loans carrying the notice provision required for a high-rate,
high-fee mortgage), the Maine Legislature will allow the secondary markets to filter
out those loans from any securitization portfolio. The better able the secondary market
is to filter out the truly risky loans, the more confidence investors will have returning
to buying mortgage-backed securities, which in turn will allow for more lending. The
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information relied upon by rating agencies needs to be more reliable in order to have
consumers return to the CDO market.
B. The Second Amendment: Correcting an Unfairness in the Burden of
Refinancing a Stated-Income Loan
The stated-income loan allows for potential homeowners who had difficulty
producing documentation supporting their income to simply “state” what they made
each year for the purpose of obtaining a home loan. Although these stated-income
loans are oftentimes referred to as “liar’s loans” or “ninja loans” (no income, no job,
and [no] assets), there are a number of reasons why an individual may have a difficult
time providing full documentation of income. Those in the service industry who rely
on tips for a large portion of their take-home income are classic examples. Of course,
stated-income loans are considered riskier than loans in which the borrowers can
produce full documentation in support of their income, so these loans carry a higher
interest rate. Under the Original Act, it is virtually impossible to write or receive a
stated-income loan because of the depth of the statutorily-imposed factors that must be
considered made before making a subprime loan.
As written, in addition to the “tangible net benefit” requirement, a subprime
mortgage loan may not be extended to a borrower unless a reasonable creditor would
believe at the time the loan is closed that the borrower will be able to make the
scheduled payments associated with the loan. According to the Original Act,
(1) The determination of a borrower's reasonable ability to repay a subprime
mortgage loan must include, but may not be limited to, consideration of the
borrower's income, including statements submitted by or on behalf of the borrower
in the loan application, except that a creditor may not disregard facts and circumstances that indicate that the income statements submitted by or on behalf of the
borrower are inaccurate or incomplete, credit history, current obligations and
employment status; the debt-to-income ratio of the borrower's monthly gross income,
including the costs of property taxes and insurance; and other available financial
resources other than the borrower's equity in the principal dwelling that secures or
would secure the subprime mortgage loan.182

This “checklist” seems to still allow room for a stated-income loan, although, it is
unclear under what factual scenario the lender could satisfy the inquiry without full
documentation of income. Importantly, these requirements apply to both the legitimate
subprime and illegitimate predatory lending market with equal vigor. Hence, this
analysis must be preformed without independent consideration as to whether the terms
of the loan are high-rate, high-fee.
The State of Nevada recently enacted a similar provision regarding stated-income
loans.183 The new legislation, which places a burden on the lender to investigate a
borrower’s income and ability to repay, garnered more media attention in Nevada than
the similar provision in Maine. This is unsurprising when one considers that many
more people in Nevada are dependent on tips for a large portion of their income due

182. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A, § 8-206-D(1) (West 2008) (emphasis added).
183. See Assemb. 440, 74th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2007) amending NEV. REV. STAT. Ann. §
598D.100 (West 2008).
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to Nevada’s robust gaming entertainment industry. However, it is no defense of the
Maine legislation to say that it impacts a smaller portion of the community; the fairness
of the legislation should be evaluated independently of the size of the impact.
The concerns voiced about the Nevada legislation are similar to those voiced
throughout this Comment. After passage of the legislation in Nevada, several large
banks stated that they will no longer purchase stated-income loans from Nevada.184
Additionally, under Maine’s Original Act, there was no provision allowing borrowers
who received a stated-income loan prior to the passage of the Original Act with no
paperwork burden to refinance into a mortgage that offers a better rate unless,
somehow, they could produce documentation of income. This is indicative of the
absence of debate before passing this legislation. It apparently did not occur to the
legislature that a borrower faced with this situation would not be able to meet the new
documentation requirements and the legislature would have, in effect, locked a
borrower into a loan that could not be refinanced. Thankfully, the legislature has
subsequently exempted the paperwork burden from borrowers who received a statedincome loan prior to passage of the Original Act.185
V. CONCLUSION
The Maine Legislature undertook an ambitious plan to rewrite the lending laws in
Maine. Unfortunately, the legislature should have focused on the narrower problem
of stopping predatory lending instead of drafting an overhaul of the state’s lending
laws. This Comment suggests that the legislature has already provided a disciplined
and orderly process to refocus the Original Act to solve the problem of predatory
lending while working within its current draft.
By focusing more closely on those loans with the most onerous terms, the most
potential for abuse, and the highest-risk of default (i.e., the so-called “high-rate, highfee loans”), the legislature could offer Maine homeowners the protection they deserve
without running the risk of drying up the credit markets in Maine. Although, this
Comment does not deny that the Original Act may accomplish its stated goal of
alleviating some of the problems with predatory lending in Maine, the Original Act
goes far beyond simply attacking predatory lending. This overreaching by the
legislature has too great a price to justify the successes in the battle against predatory
lending. If the legislature wants to overhaul the lending laws of Maine, there should
be an open debate touching on all types of lending: prime, subprime, and predatory.
However, until the legislature is prepared to engage in that debate, they should
continue to amend the Original Act to narrow its application solely to high-rate, highfee loans.

184. In the aftermath of the passage of the Nevada legislation on stated-income loans, “Wells Fargo &
Co. and M&T Bank, a $57 billion-asset bank in western New York State, said that they will stop buying
stated-income loans from Nevada. The sources also indicated Credit Suisse has stopped buying any home
mortgage loans from Nevada.” John G. Edwards, Mortgage Meltdown: New Law Tightens Lending, LAS
VEGAS REV.-J., Sept. 29, 2007, at A1. Brock Davis, president of the Southern Nevada Chapter of the
Mortgage Bankers Association, notes that the virtual ban on stated-income lending in Nevada “could make
it even more difficult for many [homeowners who have adjustable rate mortgages] to refinance their
mortgages because they won’t be able to offer proof of income.” Id.
185. See supra note 26.

